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CEDAW, the Islamic State, and
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
ABSTRACT
Tales of the Islamic State (ISIL) and the group's brutality shocked the
world for several years. Now, however, ISIL has been nearly defeated.
As ISIL has lost territorial control, the world has learned more details
about its cruel enslavement system, including the severe sexual
violence that ISIL inflicted on the Yazidis. Now, many advocates are
calling for justice for the Yazidis and other victims of ISIL's sexual
violence. This Note uses the case of the Yazidis to examine the
strengths and limits of the international framework for addressing
conflict-related sexual violence. In particular, this Note examines the
history of the international community's response to conflict-related
sexual violence and how the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women provides a useful, though
imperfect, framework for addressing this issue. This Note discusses
how the due diligence standard requires states to investigate, punish,
and redress conflict-related sexual violence, and how Iraq, in its
current state, may provide accountability for the crimes committed by
ISIL through prosecutions, reparations, and other reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, the Islamic State's (ISIL) so-called capital of
Raqqa fell to a US-backed alliance of Syrian fighters, representing a
kind of symbolic end to ISIL as a self-declared nation-state
controlling significant physical territory.' Similarly, with the capture
of Mosul and other ISIL territory, Iraqi forces have celebrated the
nearly complete defeat of ISIL in Iraq.2 As these forces recapture
territory, the process of reintegration and redress for civilians who
suffered under Islamic State control is an imminent issue.
On August 22, 2017, the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq issued a human rights report regarding
the protection of rights of victims who experienced sexual violence
under ISIL in Iraq. 3 The report describes how large numbers of
women and girls, as well as a number of men and boys, suffered
conflict-related sexual violence by ISIL.4 The report also lays out the
1. Raqqa: IS 'capital' falls to US-backed Syrian forces, BBC (Oct. 17, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41646802 [https://perma.cc/4BFM-RUQF]
(archived Aug. 26, 2018).
2. David Zucchino, 'Game Over.' Iraqi Forces See Beginning of the End for
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-hawija.html
[https:/perma.cc/6QA8-SJB4] (archived Aug. 30, 2018).
3. See generally U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE CAPTURED
BY ISIL/OR IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY ISIL IN IRAQ (2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMIReport22Aug2Ol7_EN.pdf
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legal framework-international, national, and regional laws-for
supporting these victims and provides recommendations for the Iraqi
government to pursue in order to best protect the rights of women
and girls who survived conflict-related sexual violence.5
Due to the targeting of the Yazidi community and the extensive
coverage of their plight, this Note will use the Yazidis and ISIL as a
case study ior discussing and examining the broader problem of
conflict-related sexual violence. This focus does not mean to ignore
that sexual violence during this conflict has touched more than the
Yazidi community, including individuals of different religions,
nationalities, and even genders, though women still remain a
significant portion of the survivors.6
Part II of this Note provides general background on the conflict
in Iraq and Syria involving ISIL. In particular, Part II focuses on
ISIL's system of sexual enslavement, its targeting of the Yazidi
community, and how survivors are faring thus far. Part II also
discusses the history of sexual violence in international law, including
the international community's sluggish response to the issue of
violence against women, both domestically and in the context of
conflict. Because there is no treaty on violence against women, Part
III explains how the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the leading international
treaty on women's equal treatment, obligates states to prevent,
investigate, punish, and ensure redress for acts of discrimination
against women, including sexual and domestic violence. Part IV
applies the CEDAW due-diligence framework to the situation in Iraq
and discusses options for criminal accountability, such as the duty to
investigate and punish, and options for reparations and other
reforms, such as the duty to redress.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ISIL in Iraq and Syria
The "Islamic State" has become more famous in the last few
years for its actions in Syria, Iraq, and beyond, but it has existed
5. Id. TT 14-30.
6. See Heather Hurlburt & Jacqueline O'Neill, We Need to Think Harder About
Terrorism and Gender. ISIS Already Is, VOx (June 1, 2017, 11:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/6/1/15722746/terrorism-gender-women-
manchester-isis-counterterrorism [https://perma.cc/99DG-EJYK] (archived Aug. 26,
2018) (discussing ISIS's strategic use of gender dynamics to "build" their state and
bond its fighters, such as the mass enslavement of minority women and reports of
male-on-male rape, often videotaped for blackmail purposes).
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under various names and shapes since the early 1990s.7 It merged
and interacted with various other Islamic insurgents in Iraq in the
2000s, but the "Islamic State" we know today came to power after the
Syrian rebellion against Bashar al-Assad; at this point, the group's
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, renamed it the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). 8 ISIL began a campaign of expansion to cover
90,800 square kilometers of Syria and Iraq, including several major
cities.9
In August 2014, ISIL's territorial campaign expanded its
territory to include the area around Mount Sinjar, home to a religious
minority called the Yazidis.'0 The Yazidis are a small group of ethnic
Kurds numbering around five hundred thousand people total." They
practice a syncretic, monotheistic religion with elements of
Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, Mathdaism, and other local traditions.'
2
Because of this blend of religious elements and misinterpretations of
their religion, some Muslim populations have labeled the Yazidis as
"devil worshippers" and have targeted them for persecution for
several hundred years. 13 In the 1970s, for instance, Saddam
Hussein's Arabization programs forced Yazidis to leave their villages
and to relocate in cities like Sinjar.14
In line with this tradition of persecution, ISIL's treatment of the
Yazidis has been particularly brutal. Upon capturing Yazidis, ISIL
immediately separated the men and women, then executed the men
and confined young, unmarried girls in schools, palaces, and various
other municipal buildings in the cities.'5 From there, the girls and
women became part of ISIL's extensive, organized sex trade, which
included slave markets.16 Most scholars and journalists agree that
7. Bobby Ghosh, ISIS: A Short History, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2014/08/isis-a-short-history/
3 7 6 03 0 /
[https://perma.ccW4WT-BLCK] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
8. Id.
9. Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug.
13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theo
logy-of-rape.html [https://perma.cc/JFL9-KKLR] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
10. Id.
11. Avi Asher-Schapiro, Who are the Yazidis, the Ancient, Persecuted Religious
Minority Struggling to Survive in Iraq, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140809-iraq-yazidis-minority-isil-




15. Callimachi, supra note 9; see also Human Rights Council, "They Came to
Destroy"" ISIS Crimes Against the Yezidis, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-Second
Session, T 49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2, (June 15, 2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-32_CRP.2_en
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQK-RZFX] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) [hereinafter HRC Report].
16. See HRC Report, supra note 15, ¶ 55 ("ISIS sells Yazidi women and girls in
slave markets, or souk sabaya, or as individual purchases to fighters who come to the
[VOL. 51:14231426
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this widespread campaign of sexual enslavement was not
implemented against other religious minorities, an idea later
confirmed by ISIL's propaganda magazine.1 7
The Yazidis were intentionally targeted because they were not
"People of the Book," like Jews and Christians, so could pay a tax
known as jizya or jizyah to be set free.18 To justify the human
trafficking, ISIL cited specific verses in the Quran, as well as other
religious writings that sanctioned slavery and provided detailed rules
for the practice.19 This "theology of rape" is exemplified by accounts of
ISIL fighters kneeling to pray right before and after forcing
themselves on young girls: in one telling example, a fighter took time
to explain to his twelve-year-old victim that the Quran gave him the
right to rape her and encouraged the act.20 In the slave markets
themselves, girls were observed and forced to answer intimate
questions, including questions about their last menstrual cycle, in
order to keep in line with a Shariah rule that men cannot have sex
with a pregnant slave.21
Responsibility for the sexual violence extended beyond the
buyers, fighters, and immediate perpetrators: to control and manage
the nearly six thousand Yazidi women captured, ISIL's sex trade
operated through an intricate bureaucracy of judges, government
officials, and markets.2 2 Institutions, like the courts set up and
administered by ISIL, have provided religious justifications for
holding centres. In some instances, an ISIS fighter might buy a group of Yazidi females
in order to take them into rural areas without slave markets where he could sell them
individually at a higher price."); Callimachi, supra note 9 (describing personal
experiences from the Islamic State's slave trade).
17. See Callimachi, supra note 9 (stating that many community leaders,
government officials, and academics believed that the Islamic State slave trade
consisted solely of Yazidi females).
18. While Christians and Jews suffered attacks and persecution under ISIL
rule, these groups retained the right to worship as long as they paid the tax. The focus
on the Yazidis stems in part because, in contrast to Christians and Jews, Yazidis
viewed as polytheists with an oral tradition rather than written scripture. See id.
(finding that the Yazidi were more despised than the Christians and Jews because they
have a written tradition); HRC Report, supra note 15, T 154 (describing the ability of
Jews and Christians to make a payment to avoid conversion or death).
19. Callimachi, supra note 9.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. (describing the judicial approval of the emancipation of a slave); HRC
Report, supra note 15, ¶ 58 ("A central committee, the Committee for the Buying and
Selling of Slaves, organises the Yazidi slave markets. Where the central committee
authorizes the opening of a slave market in a particular town, it devolves some of its
functions to a local committee and commander. An ISIS document, released online and
judged to be authentic, informed fighters were required to pre-register if they wish to
attend a slave market in Homs, and explained the procedure for buying: 'the bid is to
be submitted in the sealed envelope at the time of purchase, and the one who wins the
bid is obliged to purchase."').
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slavery as well as practical rules guiding slave transactions and
treatment. 23 For example, courts drafted and approved sales
contracts for slaves and occasionally provided documents known as
"certificates of emancipation" that freed slaves.24
ISIL forbade brothers from transferring slaves to one another
and ISIL fighters from transferring slaves to non-ISIL fighters-to
keep in line with the justification of slaves as "spoils of war" and to
prevent reselling a girl to her family. 25 Laws also provided for
reversion, ensuring slaves were not freed if their owner died intestate
but were instead returned to common ownership by ISIL who placed
them on the market again.26 As ISIL lost territory, the number of
enslaved women dwindled, so ISIL imposed restrictions designed to
stop Yazidi women from escaping, like requiring women to register in
an electronic database checked at ISIL "border" checkpoints. 27
Reports and testimony from survivors and escapees confirm the
extensive physical, mental, and emotional abuse endured at the
hands of ISIL, as well as the trauma that continues even after
escape.2 8 This trauma is compounded by the difficulties of living in
camps and the grief of losing family members.29 While all the captives
experienced horrors, the women and girls who remained under ISIL
control until the last year or two, such as those recently liberated
with the city of Mosul, have displayed signs of severe psychological
injury.3 0 One Yazidi gynecologist, who has treated over a thousand of
these rape victims, described them as "very tired," "unconscious," and
"in severe shock and psychological upset."31 This shock, reportedly
present in up to 90 percent of the women freed, is revealed frequently
as severe lethargy: women and girls sleep for days and appear unable
to wake up or sit up.32 Some have shown signs of indoctrination,
refusing to remove their face-covering niqabs and calling their ISIL
husbands "martyrs."3 3 Even journalists and aid workers experienced
23. See Callimachi, supra note 9; HRC Report, supra note 15.
24. Callimachi, supra note 9.
25. HRC Report, supra note 15, TT 75-76.
26. Id. ¶ 62.
27. Associated Press, ISIS Tightens Grip on Scores of Female Sex Slaves, CBS
(July 5, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-tightening-its-grip-on-yazidi-
women-and-children-forced-to-become-sex-slaves-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/S5M5-
ZDHP] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
28. See, e.g., Rothna Begum & Samer Muscati, Interview: These Yezidi Girls
Escaped ISIS. Now What?, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 15, 2015, 11:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/interview-these-yezidi-girls-escaped-isis-now-
what [https://perma.cc/PP4A-ZVJ3] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Callimachi, supra note 9.
32. Id.
33. Id. (explaining that even though Yazidi women traditionally do not cover
their faces, some victims refuse to remove their covers).
[VOL. 51:14231428
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in treating these kinds of victims have noted that the abuse ISIL
inflicted on the Yazidi women and girls is unlike anything they have
seen before.34
Given the scope of ISIL's sexual violence and the lack of
available resources, many victims have had to remain in camps,
where mental health treatment is poor, and many women remain
suicidal as a result of being unable to accept the amount of violence
they have experienced.3 5 Healthcare experts and advocates say there
are not enough resources to provide the necessary long-term care for
these survivors.3 6 There is also concern in the community about
abducted women and their families facing ostracism as a result of the
stigma attached to the loss of virginity.37 However, some reports,
which will be discussed in a later subpart, indicate Yazidi leaders
have made an effort to welcome back female relatives.3 8
B. History of Sexual Violence and International Law
1. Origins
Wherever and whenever there is war, there is sexual violence.3 9
Even as "rules" of armed conflict have existed and developed over
time, the maxim "to the victor goes the spoils" results in the
widespread acceptance of rape as socially acceptable conduct and a
proper reward for those victorious in war.4 0 The first known formal
international trial for violations of the rules of war occurred in 1474,
when a native of Alsace, France, Sir Peter Hagenbach, was accused
and convicted of inflicting "a reign of terror" in the town of Breisach
without declaring war.41 Because he had not formally brought the
34. See Alexandra Bradford, Freed from ISIS, Yazidi Women Remain Trapped
by Trauma, NEws DEEPLY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/womenand
girls/articles/2017/03/14/freed-isis-yazidi-women-remain-trapped-trauma
[https://perma.cc/8W2G-RHFDI (archived Aug. 31, 2018) ("It is some of the most
distressing work I have ever done, and my colleagues who have also interviewed the
survivors say that same thing."); Jomana Karadsheh & Chris Jackson, Fighting to
Bring ISIS to Justice for War Crimes against Yazidis, CNN (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/1 /middleeast/isis-yazidi-war-crimes-tribunal-
investigation/index.html [https://perma.cc/U4BW-5727] (archived Aug. 31, 2018) ("In
creativity they are absolutely unique, the throwing of homosexuals or suspected
homosexuals off tall buildings, sexual slavery in an organized way.").
35. Bradford, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Begum & Muscati, supra note 28.
38. Id.
39. KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 1 (1997).
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 29.
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rules of war into play, the court reasoned, Hagenbach was convicted
for certain abuses committed by his troops, including rape.42
Over the next few centuries, some voices began decrying wartime
sexual assault,43 and rape was eventually prohibited in Article 44 of
the 1863 Lieber Code and the Hague Regulations respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land.44
Still, rape and other sexual crimes have rarely been punished in
war tribunals.4 5 This includes the landmark International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg: despite ample evidence of tortuous
rape, forced prostitution, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and
other heinous sexual crimes, 46 rape was subsumed under more
general headings, such as "other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population." These headings themselves were within the
generic category of crimes against humanity.47
Sexual violence played a slightly larger role in the prosecution of
Japanese leaders after World War II, in part because of the publicized
horrors of Japan's military conquest of China-epitomized by the
"rape of Nanking" in which approximately two hundred thousand
women suffered sexual violence.48 The indictments in the IMT for the
Far East charged some Japanese defendants with rape and actually
did prosecute rape successfully, though secondarily under
prohibitions against "inhumane treatment," "ill-treatment," and
"failure to respect family honour and rights."
4 9
Overall, crimes of sexual violence in World War II went largely
unprosecuted, and similar crimes in subsequent conflicts went
unprosecuted on an international level for nearly the next fifty
years.5 0 This legacy of neglecting sexual violence is evident and ripe
42. Id.
43. See id. at 29-30 (describing how some early scholars and organizers of
international law such as Hugo Grotius recognized rape in war should be punished just
as much as rape in peacetime).
44. Stefan Kirchner, Wartime Rape in the Congo, in CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN
81, 85 (David Wingeate Pike ed., 2011).
45. ASKIN, supra note 39, at 32, 41-45 (describing post World War I recognition
and documentation of "unparalleled" pillage and sexual assault by the Germans,
though ultimately efforts to prosecute the war criminals on the basis of these war
crimes failed).
46. Id. at 97.
47. Id. at 131; see also Rhonda Copelon, Toward Accountability for Violence
Against Women in War: Progress and Challenges, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT
ZONES 232, 235 (Elizabeth D. Heineman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Copelon I] (attributing
the failure to prosecute rape officially in part to a reluctance to confront acts that some
Allied troops also committed).
48. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 236.
49. ASKIN, supra note 39, at 180.
50. Megan Nobert, Creating International Responsibility: The Non-Prosecution
of Sexual Violence Post Conflict as a Violation of Women's Rights, 17 TILLBURG L. REV.
63, 73 (2012).
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in international relations even today. For example, recognition of the
sexual abuse and slavery suffered by "comfort women"5 1 during World
War II remained elusive for decades. There are still tensions between
South Korea and Japan over the issue: within the last year there was
some dispute concerning the sufficiency of a 2015 agreement, in
which Japan officially apologized and agreed to pay compensation to
elderly victimS.52
After the World War II tribunals, international law slowly
recognized the specific criminality of sexual violence in both domestic
and conflict settings, including in the four Geneva Conventions and
their accompanying protocols.53 The language of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 specifically prohibits rape and forced prostitution:
"Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form
of indecent assault."54 Within the larger context of the Geneva
Conventions, however, these prohibitions may be viewed as rather
weak: rape was not listed as a crime under the category of "grave
breaches," or the most serious crimes carrying an obligation to
prosecute. rs Rather, the Geneva Convention treats rape and
sexualized violence as subject to domestic discretion and not an area
for international concern. 56 The 1977 Protocols enlarged the
prohibitions and used more expansive language regarding attacks on
personal dignity but also did not explicitly recognize sexualized
51. Comfort women is the term for the approximately 200,000 women and
young girls whom the Japanese army abducted from the Korean peninsula and other
areas. They were placed in brothels near the borders in World War II and forced to
have sex with potentially dozens of men daily. Only a few dozen identified comfort
women are still alive. See, e.g., "Comfort Women" Memorial Statues, a Thorn in Japan's
Side, Now Sit on Korean Buses, NPR (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/11/13/563838610/comfort-woman-
memorial-statues-a-thorn-in-japans-side-now-sit-on-korean-buses
[https://perma.cc/G7NP-8LR5] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
52. See David Wingeate Pike, Imperial Japan and its "Comfort Women", in
CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 44, at 9, 89 (describing how Japan managed to
evade responsibility and insisted for decades that no proof existed the military had
enslaved women in brothels during World War II); Japan and South Korea agree WW2
'comfort women' deal, BBC (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
35188135 [https://perma.cc/JW5L-P5CD] (archived Aug. 31, 2018); Ilaria Maria Sala,
Why Is the Plight of "Comfort Women" Still So Controversial?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/comfort-women-japan-south-
korea.html [https://perma.cc/T2S8-2G9D] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
53. See Eileen Servidio, Rape and Other Sexual Violence against Women and
Girls in Armed Conflict: A Legal Look at the Issues, in CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 44, at 54.
54. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 76 U.S.T. 3316, 5 U.N.T.S 287.
55. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 236.
56. Id.
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violence as a "grave breach."5 7 Some scholars have noted that the lack
of urgency and importance regarding sexual violence in international
law unfortunately mirrors the domestic treatment of rape as a moral
and "private" matter, rather than a violent crime warranting
prosecution.5 8
2. 1990s-Women's Rights Emerge as International Priority
The 1990s brought greater recognition of the issue of gender-
based violence and sexual violence in war. In the 1990s, the UN
Security Council established two ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, one for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and one for
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, to prosecute atrocities and war crimes
occurring during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and the Rwandan
genocide of 1994.59 The UN estimates that during the three months of
the 1994 Rwanda genocide, between 100,000 and 250,000 women
were raped. Rape estimates for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
range up to sixty thousand, with other conflicts marking similarly
high numbers.60 These tribunals were established in part due to
pressure from increasingly organized and vocal feminist and women's
human rights campaigns, including the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna. 61 The subsequent historic Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action condemned gender violence
and made specific mention of violations of women's rights in armed
conflict as needing an especially effective response.62 Shortly after,
the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing also focused on
violence against women as a critical issue, and over 180 governments
affirmed the resulting 1995 Beijing Declaration.
63
57. Id. at 237.
58. Id. at 237-38.
59. Id. at 242.
60. See, e.g., Background Information on Sexual Violence Used as a Tool of War,
OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON THE RWANDA GENOCIDE & THE U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwandalabout/bgsexualviolence.shtml (last
visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VNU7-TRZQ] (archived Aug. 31, 2018)
(providing UN estimates for rape in conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo).
61. See Copelon I, supra note 47, at 240-41 (describing the Vienna Conference
as a "watershed for the establishment of women's human rights internationally");
Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War, in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 197, 198
(Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter Copelon II] (describing how the
issue of rape in Bosnia emerged at the same time as a greater global feminist
movement, as displayed at the 1993 Vienna Conference, gained traction).
62. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 240-41; Copelon II, supra note 61, at 198.
63. Mala Htun & S. Laurel Weldon, The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy
Change: Combating Violence Against Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2000, 106 AM.
POL. Scl. REV. 548, 556 (2012).
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Adopted in May 1993, Article 5 of the ICTY Statute marked the
first time rape was independently acknowledged as a crime against
humanity. 64 The ICTR Statute, approved in November 1994,
improved upon the ICTY by adding rape, enforced prostitution, and
any form of indecent assault as war crimes; however, such crimes
were still considered to fall under "outrages against personal dignity"
instead of the more forceful category of violence to the person.6 5
Still, the judgments and other procedures stemming from these
tribunals became the foundation upon which accountability for
wartime sexual violence and other gender crimes was built. 66
Feminist and women's rights organizations helped shape both
tribunals' Rules of Evidence and Procedure, which stressed the need
to support victims, protect witnesses, and remove the traditional
sexism accompanying sexual crime prosecutions.6 7 For example, Rule
96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY was
progressive in recognizing the coercive nature of rape and precluding
a defense argument of consent in a sexual assault case if the victim
was threatened with or subjected to violence or duress, or reasonably
believed refusal would subject another to violence.68
After prosecutors were pressured to include rape and sexual
violence crimes in the ICTR indictments, the Akayesu Judgment in
the ICTR established that rape, defined as a "physical invasion of a
sexual nature," constituted an act of genocide. 69 The Akayesu
judgment also specifically found sexual violence was a "step in the
process of destruction of the Tutsi group-destruction of the spirit, of
the will to life, and of life itself."70 The judgment's definition of sexual
assault was later confirmed in other ICTY cases and judgments,7 1
which recognized rape and sexualized violence against women as war
crimes and crimes against humanity.72 In particular, the Kunarac
Appeal Judgment expanded these cases' definition of sexual assault
and stated that under international law, the court must consider that
other factors besides force or use of threat could render an act of
64. Susan H. Shin, Justice Delayed: Accountability in the "Comfort Women"
Case, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
413, 426 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003).
65. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 242-43.
66. Id. at 244.
67. Id. at 243.
68. ASKIN, supra note 39, at 303.
69. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 244-45.
70. Id. at 245.
71. See Nobert, supra note 50, at 74 (citing Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case
No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10,
1998); Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-
96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22,
2001)) (expanding on Akayesu's definition of sexual violence).
72. Copelon I, supra note 47, at 246.
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sexual penetration nonconsensual.7 3 It also held rape always satisfies
the first element of torture, infliction of severe physical or mental
suffering, and rape was a tool of ethnic discrimination.74 A later case,
The Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, further broadened the coercive
circumstances constituting sexual violence during conflict by finding
that coercion was implicit in the conditions of sexual assault during
conflicts.7 5
Another major international criminal justice development in the
1990s, and one influenced by feminist and women's groups, was the
establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) via
treaty, the Rome Statute.76 Although there was initial support after
both world wars, a permanent ICC remained elusive until the
dissolution of Cold War tensions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
77
By then, with the ongoing conflicts and tribunals in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the UN called for a draft statute for a permanent ICC,
which emerged in the form of the Rome Statute, passed in 1998.78
While women's advocates and groups participated in the Rome talks
and recommended a number of proposals regarding gender-based
violence, the Rome Statute was only a partial success.
7 9 Scholars
have applauded the Statute for disassociating sexual violence from
outrages on personal dignity, listing gender-based crimes in a
separate paragraph from general crimes against humanity,
specifically including sexual slavery in its definition of crimes against
humanity, and naming gender as one of the impermissible grounds
for persecution. 80 However, the Rome Statute failed in several
aspects: qualifying sexual violence and gender-based persecution on
"gravity," and requiring acts constituting crimes against humanity be
part of a widespread or systematic attack.8 1 These and other issues,
which are discussed below, preclude effective prosecution of gender-
based crimes in the ICC and other courts.
73. See Nobert, supra note 50, at 75.
74. Cop6lon I, supra note 47, at 246.
75. See The Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T,
Judgment and Sentence, TT 544-47 (Apr. 28, 2005) ("[This Chamber concurs with the
opinion that circumstances prevailing in most cases charged under international
criminal law, as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, will be
almost universally coercive, thus vitiating true consent."); Nobert, supra note 50, at 76.
76. Brook Sari Moshan, Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in the
Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 154, 154-55 (1998).
77. Id. at 165, 167-68.
78. Id. at 169-70.
79. Id. at 180.
80. Id. at 180-82.
81. Id. at 182-83.
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C. International Efforts to Combat Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
While international law has increasingly has focused its
attention on women's rights and violence against women due to the
advocacy movements of the 1990s, scholars and activists have also
called for more attention to be paid to the increased vulnerability of
women during and after armed conflict situations.8 2 As such, conflict-
related sexual violence has been the focus of considerable soft law in
recent years as an offshoot of the greater focus on gender-based
violence. 8 Conflict-related sexual violence refers to "incidents or
patterns of sexual violence against women, men, girls or boys
occurring in a conflict or post-conflict setting that have direct or
indirect links with the conflict itself or that occur in other situations
of concern such as in the context of political repression."84 This
definition encompasses "rape, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization,
forced abortion, forced prostitution, sexual exploitation, trafficking,
sexual enslavement, forced circumcision, castration, forced nudity, or
any other serious form of sexual violence."8 5
Various United Nations Security Council resolutions have
expounded upon these conventions and protocols to address conflict-
related sexual violence and broader security goals concerning women
and girls.86 For example, United Nations Security Council Resolution
1325 introduced the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, marking a
much-needed acknowledgment of how women and children in
particular "account for the vast majority of those adversely affected
by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced
persons." 8 7 The resolution's four broad pillars of priority action
include participation, protection, prevention, and relief and
82. Press Release, Security Council, Women Suffer Disproportionately During
and After War, Security Council Told During Day-Long Debate on Women, Peace and
Security, U.N. Press Release SC/7908 (Oct. 29, 2003); Daniela Nadj, Sexual violence is
a widespread weapon of war-it's time international law caught up, INDEPENDENT
(Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/sexual-violence-
women-war-feminism-gender-isis-yazidi-boko-haram-nobel-peace-prize-a8595736.html
[https://perma.cc/9RY8-S6WK] (archived Nov. 26, 2018).
83. See Catherine O'Rourke & Aisling Swaine, CEDAW and the Security
Council: Enhancing Women's Rights in Conflict, 67 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 167, 167-68
(2018) (describing several committees and resolutions addressing women's rights in
armed conflict areas).
84. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General:
Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, at 2 (June 2014), http://www.ohchr
.org/Documents/Press/GuidanceNoteReparationsJune-2014.pdf [https://perma.cclZBZ4-
68BC] (archived Aug. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Reparations Guidance Note].
85. Id. at 2-3.
86. OHCHR UNAMI Report, supra note 3, ¶ 14.
87. See generally S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
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recovery.8 8 The resolution also contains language specifically calling
on all parties to armed conflict to protect women and girls from
gender-based violence and reiterating the need to prosecute those
who commit crimes in conflict situations.8 9
In June 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1820, which recognized and condemned rape as a war
tactic.90 Using especially strong language, this resolution stresses
that wartime rape as a military strategy constitutes a threat to
international peace and security,9 1 recognizes sexual violence as a
breach of international law, and emphasizes the need to exclude
sexual violence amnesty provisions in the context of conflict
resolution processes.92 Other resolutions such as 1888 (2009),93 1889
(2009), 94 1960 (2010), 9 2106 (2013), 96 and 2122 (2013) 9 have
similarly addressed conflict-related sexual violence and the unique
needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict conditions.
9 8
Although these are positive developments, the Security Council's
focus has remained limited to sexual violence as a tactic in war rather
than the broader issue of gender-based violence, as other UN bodies
have addressed.9 9
The UN and its human-rights-focused agencies have also
recognized that the international community needs to pay more
attention to conflict-related sexual violence, gender-based violence,
88. See, e.g., WOMEN WATER, U.N. STRATEGIC RESULTS FRAMEWORK ON WOMEN,
PEACE AND SECURITY: 2011-2020 (July 2011), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/
taskforces/wps/StrategicFramework_2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VH4-5GJQ]
(archived Aug. 31, 2018).
89. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 87, ¶¶ 10-11.
90. See S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2008) (taking steps to address widespread
sexual violence).
91. Id.
92. Id. T 4; Sahla Aroussi, 'Women, Peace, and Security: Addressing
Accountability for Wartime Violence, 13 INT'L FEMINIST J. POL. 576, 581 (2011)
(describing the firmer position of the Security Council on the issue of accountability for
gender-based violence by expressing in its operative paragraphs its readiness to take
measures).
93. See generally S.C. Res. 1888 (Sept. 39, 2009) (mandating peacekeeping
missions to protect women and girls from sexual violence in armed conflict).
94. See generally S.C. Res. 1889 (Oct. 5, 2009) (urging additional measures to
improve women's participation in peace processes and discussing the key role women
can play in post-conflict societies).
95. See generally S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010) (responding to the "slow"
progress and providing an accountability system for combating conflict-related sexual
violence).
96. See generally S.C. Res. 2106 (Jun. 24, 2013) (focusing on ending impunity
for perpetrators of sexual violence against both women and men).
97. See generally S.C. Res. 2122 (Oct. 18, 2013) (focusing on strengthening the
role of women in various stages of conflict prevention and resolution).
98. OHCHR UNAMI Report, supra note 3, ¶ 14.
99. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 191.
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and transitional justice in post-conflict settings."oo A 2014 report from
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights that focused on gender-based and sexual violence in relation to
transitional justice stressed the need to incorporate gender-based and
sexual violence into the work of post-conflict truth-seeking processes
like truth commissions.1 0 The report also highlighted the importance
of women's participation to ensure adequate redress for violations
and proper reform. 102 In 2016, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 2331, which expressly condemned all acts of trafficking,
particularly "the sale or trade in persons undertaken by the 'Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant,"' including of Yazidis and other
minority members, and recognized the importance of "collecting and
preserving evidence relating to such acts in order to ensure that those
responsible can be held accountable."0 3
These developments reflect how the international community,
led by the UN, has been increasingly willing to discuss and label
sexual violence at the level of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 104 These expansive definitions mark a rhetorical shift
towards condemning sexual violence, though in practice actual
prevention and solutions are harder to implement.
III. CEDAW AS A FRAMEWORK FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
A. History of CEDAW
While the above-mentioned sources have been important in the
development of human rights, CEDAW stands out as one of the key
sources of international human rights law targeting the unequal
treatment of women.105 Adopted in 1979, CEDAW is one of the most
widely ratified human rights treaties, with 189 parties.106 It was
adopted, in part, as an acknowledgement that the "mainstream"
human rights instruments and framework were inadequate to guard
100. See generally Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Analytical
Study Focusing on Gender-Based and Sexual Violence in Relation to Transitional
Justice, Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/21
(2014).
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id. at 4.
103. S.C. Res. 2331, T 11 (Dec. 20, 2016).
104. Id. T$ 8, 10.
105. Status of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang-en#top (last visited Oct. 11,
2018) [perma.cc/SC36-QLBL] (archived Aug. 24, 2018) [hereinafter CEDAW Status].
106. Id.
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and promote the rights of women.07 CEDAW contains the following
definition of discrimination against women:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
1 05
The treaty requires states to condemn discrimination in all its
forms and to undertake a number of actions including: embedding
gender equality in national constitutions, forbidding discriminating
against women through appropriate legislation, establishing
institutional legal protections of the equal rights of women, and
generally taking all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women by any person or enterprise.10 9 In Article 5, one of the
most controversial and far-reaching provisions, the CEDAW
Convention calls on states to "take all appropriate measures to
modify social and cultural patterns of conduct" in order to eliminate
prejudices, customs, and stereotyped ideas of the superiority or
inferiority of genders.10 The other duties listed in CEDAW span
many aspects of life, private and public, from family to workplace to
government."1
The treaty establishes a system of accountability for the
enumerated list of rights by establishing an independent committee
of experts who undertake a periodic review of state compliance."
2
Beyond the normal reporting procedures, the CEDAW Committee
may, on an "exceptional" basis under Article 18, request a state party
provide a report on potential violations of particular concern.
113 In
2000, the Optional Protocol to the Convention entered force, creating
an individual communications mechanism and an inquiry procedure
for "grave or systematic violations" of the Convention.
114 These
procedures remain limited to state parties who have ratified the
107. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 173.
108. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW].
109. Id. art. 2.
110. Id. art. 5.
111. Elizabeth Friedman, Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a
Movement, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 18, 23 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
112. CEDAW, supra note 108, art. 17-18.
113. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 181.
114. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of




Optional Protocol and chosen not to opt out of the latter procedure; as
of early 2018, this number was limited to about 109 parties.11 5
There are further limitations on the CEDAW Committee's reach
and potential for real accountability. First, CEDAW only applies to
state parties to the Convention-the United States is not a party, for
example.116 Second, the result of so many state parties signing onto
CEDAW is the large amount of reservations; CEDAW is one of the
human rights treaties with the highest number of reservations.1 17
Iraq has made several substantive reservations to the CEDAW
Convention, concerning measures such as modifying existing laws
and/or customs, repealing national penal provisions, and ensuring
equality of men and women in matters relating to marriage and
family." 8 In submitting a reservation to the last of these provisions,
Iraq joined a number of Islamic countries in reserving an Islamic
Shariah law exception.'1 9 Other accountability issues arise from the
fact that CEDAW's application is limited to states, and, in the conflict
context, the fact that the Committee's general recommendations
regarding conflict-related sexual violence are soft law and are
therefore only persuasive, not binding, under international law.120
Still, some studies have found CEDAW to be more successful
than other human rights treaties in producing a statistically
significant positive effect on human rights.121 For example, some
studies find a general connection between CEDAW commitment and
higher levels of female life expectancy and female literacy.122 Some
scholars, such as Beth Simmons, have attributed the impact of
human rights treaties like CEDAW not to the direct relationship with
states, but with the organizing framework the CEDAW Committee
115. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 174; Status of Optional Protocol to
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg-no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&ang--en (last visited Oct. 11, 2018)
[https://perma.cclG8GL-CKEB] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
116. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 174.
117. Id. at 175.
118. See CEDAW Status, supra note 105 (listing Iraq's reservations to articles 2,
16, and 29 of CEDAW).
119. See id. ("The reservation to this last-mentioned article shall be without
prejudice to the provisions of the Islamic Shariah according women rights equivalent to
the rights of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance between them.").
120. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 175.
121. Id. at 183 (citing NA Englehart & MK Miller, The CEDAW Effect:
International Law's Impact on Women's Rights, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 22 (2014)).
122. Kevin L. Cope & Cossette D. Creamer, Disaggregating the Human Rights
Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 459, 467 (2016) (citing Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul
Kittilson & Wayne Sandholtz, Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries,
1975-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 293 (2006)).
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can provide to those seeking domestic reform.123 In some areas, like
females' access to education, CEDAW's ability to improve was more
statistically significant in transitional countries than in stable
autocracies or stable democracies; 124 sometimes the level of
democracy in a certain year had no apparent impact on gender ratios
in schools, while the presence of active international women NGOs
did have an association with greater female enrollment ratios.
125
Essentially, CEDAW has little effect unless there are conditions for
women to mobilize politically in the country. 126 In line with
Simmons's hypothesis, other scholars have found mere ratification of
CEDAW does not seem to have any effect on specific areas of concern
like violence against women.127
B. CEDAW's Incorporation of Violence against Women
The CEDAW Convention, notably, does not mention armed
conflict, war, or violence anywhere in its text, unlike other human
rights treaties like the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
1 28 It
also does not explicitly delineate the right to remedies, reparation,
and compensation.
129
Given this gap, in recent years the treaty's monitoring body, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW Committee) has made a point to clarify that CEDAW
prohibits gender-based violence broadly as a form of
discrimination. 130 In General Recommendation Number 19, the
CEDAW Committee explicitly included gender-based violence-
defined as violence that is directed against a woman because she is a
woman or that affects women disproportionately-within the
definition of discrimination in Article 1. 131 This recommendation
stated such violence may breach provisions of CEDAW, regardless of
an explicit mention of violence in the treaty provision.1
32 While
123. BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 126 (2009).
124. Id. at 217.
125. Id. at 221-22.
126. Id. at 254-55 ("Where they have both the motive and the means to use
international law to improve their rights chances, the CEDAW has proved to be a
powerful tool in their hands.").
127. Htun & Weldon, supra note 63, at 561.
128. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3.; CEDAW, supra note 108.
129. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Catherine O'Rourke & Aisling Swaine, Transforming
Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Principles and Practice, 28 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 97, 115 (2015).
130. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Violence





reparations also were not explicitly mentioned, the CEDAW
Committee recommended "effective complaints procedures and
remedies, including compensation, should be provided" and stated
states may also be "responsible for private acts if they fail to act with
due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation."1 3 3 General
Recommendation Number 28 confirmed that states' obligations are
not lessened in an armed conflict situation.134
The most explicit and influential statement on women's human
rights in the conflict context is the CEDAW Committee's General
Recommendation Number 30.135 Stressing the special need for human
rights protection in conflict situations, 136 this recommendation
discusses state responsibility for nonstate actors under the CEDAW
Convention. 137 States are required "to regulate non-State actors
under the duty to protect, such that States must exercise due
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and ensure redress for the
acts of private individuals or entities that impair the rights enshrined
in the Convention."1 3 8 The recommendation also aims to connect the
obligations of CEDAW with the framework of the Women, Peace, and
Security Agenda (WPS Agenda) set out in UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions;1 3 9 for instance, state
parties are supposed to provide reports on compliance with the goals
and benchmarks of the WPS Agenda.140 The CEDAW Committee also
makes it clear that nonstate actors, while not parties to the
Convention, may be required to respect international human rights,
especially when such actors have an identifiable political structure
and exercise territorial control. 141 This position supports the
compatibility and interaction of international criminal law and the
133. Id. TT 9, 24 (emphasis added).
134. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 28, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. C/2010/47/GC.2 (2010) ('The obligations of
States parties do not cease in periods of armed conflict or in states of emergency
resulting from political events or natural disasters.").
135. See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 30, U.N. Doe. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Nov. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter General Recommendation 30].
136. Id. T 2.
137. Id. TT 10, 12.
138. Id. ¶ 15.
139. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 194 ("GR30 is inter alia an effort to
give retrospective legal status to the UNSC resolution 1325 and its successors.").
140. See General Recommendation 30, supra note 135, ¶ 84 ("States parties are
to provide information on the implementation of the Security Council agenda on
women, peace and security, in particular resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888
(2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), including by specifically
reporting on compliance with any agreed United Nations benchmarks or indicators
developed as part of that agenda.").
141. Id. T 16.
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Convention's obligations,14 2 as the Committee emphasizes that gross
violations of human rights and humanitarian law may lead to
individual criminal responsibility. 143 This is an example of the
CEDAW Committee's interpretive role, namely its ability to influence
the normative development of international human rights law
through its interpretations of the treaty and connections with other
human rights soft law.144
These kinds of soft law documents demonstrate how, despite the
its weaknesses, CEDAW remains an important tool for accountability
of violence against women in peacetime and wartime-especially as
long as an issue-specific treaty on violence against women does not
exist.145 The CEDAW Committee's periodic compliance review has
brought to light post-conflict women's rights issues, such as
democratic representation of women in post-conflict governments,'4 6
involvement of women in peace or transition processes,147 and how
conflict affects substantive nondiscrimination rights.14 8 The CEDAW
Committee can use this compliance review, as well as soft law
statements and special "exceptional" requests for state reports under
Article 18, to bring attention to specific cases of concern, including
conflict-related sexual violence. 149 As scholars have noted, these
special reports have usually been requested of states who are
experiencing or recently experienced conflicts; the first request in
1995 to countries in the former Yugoslavia asked for reports
142. See id. ¶ 23 (stating that states parties' obligations to prevent, investigate,
and punish sexual violence are reinforced by international criminal law, in which
enslavement, rape, and other crimes of sexual violence may qualify as a war crime,
crime against humanity, or act of genocide).
143. Id. 1 16.
144. O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 83, at 182.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 180 (citing Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations to Serbia, U.N. Doe.
CEDAW/C/SCG/CO/1 (June 11, 2007); Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations to Rwanda, U.N. Doe
CEDAW/C/RWA/CO/6 (Feb. 12, 2009)).
147. See id. (citing Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Concluding Observations to Israel, T 22, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/3 (Aug. 3, 2005); Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observation to Cyprus, ¶ 270, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5 (June 13, 2006)).
148. See id. (citing Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Concluding Observations to Sierra Leone, 1 30, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/SLE/CO/5 (June 11, 2007); Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations to Colombia, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/COLICO/6 (Feb. 20, 2007); Comm. for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations to Liberia, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C[LBRICO/6 (Aug. 14, 2009)).




regarding acts of violence against women and girls during the
conflict, specifically including the act of rape as a weapon of war.15 0
This kind of CEDAW Committee activity, while sometimes
nonbinding, has serious symbolic and practical value.15 1 As will be
discussed below, the CEDAW Committee's work forms the backdrop
for more substantive standards and frameworks like due diligence.
C. Due Diligence
The due diligence standard is a long-established standard in
international law, and provides a means for determining whether a
state has breached one of its primary obligations under international
law.152 One of the first and strongest invocations of the standard in
the context of human rights was Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, a
1988 case from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights involving
a disappearance, likely at the hands of state officials. The court held
Honduras failed to fulfill its obligations under the American
Convention on Human Rights:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the iolation or to respond to it
as required by the Convention.1 5 3
Regional courts, like the European Court of Human Rights,154 as
well as other human rights treaty monitoring bodies, have reflected
or used parallel reasoning to Veldsquez to find positive obligations to
150. Id.
151. Id. at 181-82 ("In symbolic terms, the request highlights international
awareness and concern with the gender-specific impact of conflict on women's rights in
particular conflict settings. In practical terms, the request requires State parties to
gather further information, data and evidence concerning the gender-specific impact of
conflict, which can in turn usefully support local women's movements in seeking
amelioration and redress for the most exigent effects of conflict on women.").
152. Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, The History and Development of the Due
Diligence Standard in International Law and its Role in the Protection of Women
against Violence, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM
VIOLENCE 48-50 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008).
153. Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Case 7920, Judgment, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 22/86, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 ¶ 172 (1998).
154. See, e.g., Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998) ("It is thus
accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also
imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to
take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from
the criminal acts of another individual.").
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prevent, investigate, prosecute, punish, and provide remedies for
violent acts done by private actors.15 5
In the realm of violence against women, the due diligence
standard is no different. For example, in Article 4 of the 1993
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the UN
General Assembly stated that states should "exercise due diligence to
prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation,
punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are
perpetrated by the State or by private persons."
15 6 The 2006 report of
the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women labeled the due
diligence standard as a "yardstick to determine whether a State has
met or failed to meet its obligations in combating violence against
women."157
State compliance with obligations of due diligence is measured
by the following considerations: ratification of international human
rights instruments; constitutional guarantees of equality; national
legislation and/or administrative sanctions providing adequate
redress for female victims of violence; policies addressing the issue of
violence against women; the gender sensitivity of the criminal justice
system and police; accessibility and availability of support services;
measures aimed at raising awareness and modifying discriminatory
policies in the field of education and the media; and the collection of
data and statistics concerning violence against women.
158 The Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women also concluded that, based on
practice and opinio juris, the obligation to prevent and respond to
acts of violence against women with due diligence rises to the level of
a rule of customary international law.159 Increasingly, the CEDAW
Committee or monitoring body has focused on the state's affirmative
duty to prevent violence against individuals or certain groups at risk.
For example, in the A.T. v. Hungary case, the woman claimant
alleged the state failed to provide her with "effective protection from
155. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 on the nature of
the General Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (Mar. 29, 2004) ("There may be circumstances in which a
failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations
by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties' permitting or failing to
take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate
or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.").
156. G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 4, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women (Dec. 20, 1993), http://www.un.org/documents/galres/48/a48r104.htm
[https://perma.ccl8R8Q-WWSZ] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
157. Yakin Ertiirk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes
and Consequences), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of
Violence against Women, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/206/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).
158. Id. ¶ 32 (citing an earlier report on domestic violence for the list of
considerations).
159. Id. T 29.
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the serious risk to her physical integrity, physical and mental health
and her life" from her former husband.160
Regarding the narrower issue of conflict-related sexual violence,
one of the state's key obligations under CEDAW is the duty to
respond to acts of violence against women, including duties to
investigate, punish, and provide redress, articulated in the due
diligence standard. 161 In its recent literature on conflict-related
sexual violence, the CEDAW Committee has cited its previous
explanations of the due diligence obligations regarding violence
against women, particularly the principle that "States parties will be
responsible if they fail to take all appropriate measures to prevent as
well as to investigate, prosecute, punish and provide reparation for
acts or omissions by non-State actors which result in gender-based
violence against women."162 Under the duty to protect, the CEDAW
Committee recommends implementing measures to help female
complainants of gender-based violence through legal processes,
including access to legal aid, various health and counseling services,
and training and employment opportunities for women survivors and
their families.16 3 As for prosecution and punishment, CEDAW builds
on its previous work to call on states to ensure victims of sexual
violence have "effective access" to courts; this means the formal
application of criminal law to bring perpetrators to trial, and not just
diverting victims to alternatives like mediation.164 Beyond criminal
liability, the CEDAW Committee also recognizes the duty to provide
effective reparations, both monetary and in the form of various social
services, especially within transitional justice mechanisms or post-
conflict situations.16 5
160. AT. v. Hungary, Communication No. 2/2003, Views of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, ¶ 9.2 (Jan. 26, 2005), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
protocol/decisions-views/CEDAW%20Decision%20on%20AT%20vs%2OHungary%20
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET44-2CYV] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
161. Ertfirk, supra note 157, ¶f 32, 29.
162. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General
Recommendation No. 19, T 24, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July 14, 2017) [hereinafter
General Recommendation 35]; see also General Recommendation 30, supra note 135, ¶
15 ("In its general recommendations Nos. 19 and 28, the Committee has outlined due
diligence obligations in protecting women from violence and discrimination,
emphasizing that, alongside constitutional and legislative measures, States parties
must also provide adequate administrative and financial support for the
implementation of the Convention.").
163. General Recommendation 35, supra note 162, ¶ 40.
164. Id. TT 44-45.
165. Id. IT 46-47.
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IV. APPLYING DUE DILIGENCE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR
CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ
Sexual violence within the ISIL conflict has received a lot of
attention, especially due to the well-documented plight of the Yazidi
women. The government of Iraq has responded by expressing its
commitment to combating conflict-related sexual violence, in line
with its due diligence obligations.166 In 2016, the UN and Iraq signed
a cooperation agreement, the Joint Communiqu6, to ensure
structured collaboration between the UN and Iraq regarding a
comprehensive response to conflict-related sexual violence,
highlighting six priority areas: legislative and policy reform,
accountability, services and reparations, engagement of religious and
tribal leaders as well as community groups, integration of gender
considerations into counterterrorism measures, and awareness
raising. 167 The proposed response and support include the
documentation and collection of evidence of such crimes;
strengthening the Iraqi legal framework to be able to better deal with
sexual violence; and providing mechanisms for victim
compensation.16 8 While Iraq has expressed continued commitment in
these areas,169 the actual implementation of these due diligence
obligations has had mixed results.
A. Accountability: Due Diligence in the Criminal Sphere
CEDAW and international human rights bodies have clearly
delineated the duties of investigation, punishment, and redress for
crimes of sexual violence in conflict. However, while there has been
significant evidence of ISIL's organized program of sexual violence
and enslavement, criminal prosecutions of ISIL members for these
gender-specific crimes remains unlikely.
166. Press Release, United Nations Iraq, The United Nations and the
Government of Iraq Sign Landmark Agreement on the Prevention and Response to
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.uniraq.comlindex.php?
option=com-k2&view=item&id=5552:the-united-nations-and-the-government-of-iraq-
sign-landmark-agreement-on-the-prevention-and-response-to-conflict-related-sexual-
violence&Itemid=605&lang=en [https://perma.cc/3EYJ-V475] (archived Aug. 31, 2018)
[hereinafter United Nations Iraq].
167. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, T 41,
U.N. Doc. S/2017/249 (Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.un.org/enlevents/elimination-of-
sexual-violence-in-conflict/pdf1l494280398.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LDC-NHD7]
(archived Aug. 31, 2018).
168. United Nations Iraq, supra note 166.
169. Iraq Confirms Commitment to Prevention of Sexual Violence, THE BAGHDAD
POST (June 19, 2017, 11:36 AM), http://www.thebaghdadpost.comlen/story/12260/Iraq-
confirms-commitment-to-prevention-of-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/Z8CF-VFRV]
(archived Aug. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Iraq Confirms Commitment].
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There are several different options to prosecute ISIL for its
crimes, including the ICC, an ad hoc international criminal tribunal,
national or local courts, or foreign national courts. While CEDAW's
due diligence standard only relates to domestic prosecutions, this
Note will quickly address the option of an international criminal trial.
1. International Criminal Options
Many activists and journalists have focused on prosecuting ISIL
in an international criminal setting, particularly for their kidnapping
and enslaving of Yazidi women.170 As early as March 2015, the UN
acknowledged in a report by the UN Assistant Mission in Iraq and
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that ISIL's actions
may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly
genocide.171 Significant UN actors, including High Commissioner
Zeid vin Ra'ad and France, a permanent member of the Security
Council, have also have expressed support for prosecution by the
ICC.1 72
While accountability at the ICC has been proposed and discussed
by many scholars, there remain obstacles to actual progress. Activists
and advocates have already expressed frustration at the inaction of
the ICC regarding ISIL's crimes. One such activist is Nadia Murad,
who was only twenty-one when she and other Yazidi women were
abducted and sold into sexual slavery by ISIL in 2014.173 Murad has
admitted she is worn out from telling her harrowing story over and
over to diplomats, though still determined to find accountability for
ISIL's crimes.1 74 At one Security Council briefing in 2017, she asked
diplomats bluntly what more they needed to act.'7 5 As Murad's
frustration reflects, even when there is international commitment to
170. Alexandra King, Former ISIS Sex Slave Demands Justice for Yazidis, CNN
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/19/middleeast/nadia-murad-amal-
clooney-cnntv/index.html [perma.cc/N5RV-JFN7] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
171. Human Rights Council, On the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in Light of
Abuses Committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and
Associated Groups, Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/18, (Mar. 27, 2015).
172. Joshua Keating, Why It's So Hard to Prosecute ISIS for War Crimes, SLATE
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2015/04/08/isis-and-the-icc
why-it-s willbe-toughjtoprosecute the islamic state for.html [perma.cc/8YTT-
Y8HU] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
173. Somini Sengupta, For a Yazidi Woman, Justice for ISIS Crimes is Still
Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/middle
east/for-a-yazidi-woman-justice-for-isis-crimes-is-still-elusive.html [perma.cc/3JL2-
G952] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
174. Id.
175. See id. ("[S]he looked up from her notes at one point and snapped, in halting
English at a room full of hushed diplomats from the world's most powerful countries.
'What more do you need before you will act?' she asked bluntly.").
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accountability, there is often a gap between the priorities of
international actors and local communities. International actors may
be "more concerned about sending a general deterrent message
regarding atrocities than about the specific, long-term needs of the
particular post-conflict society directly involved."176
At present, it is unlikely ISIL members will be prosecuted at the
ICC. First, under the Rome Statue the ICC does not have jurisdiction
over situations of conflict that occur in states that have not signed the
Rome Statute, which neither Iraq nor Syria have.'77 The only way the
ICC can exercise jurisdiction in such countries is through a referral
by the Security Council; such a referral is unlikely, given that in May
2014 Russia and China, two permanent members of the UN Security
Council, vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have
referred the situation in Syria to the ICC.178 Furthermore, a referral
or acceptance of jurisdiction by either country opens the door to the
entire conflict being examined for war crimes and human rights
violations, not just crimes committed by ISIL.179 Both Russia and the
United States may be hesitant to grant such jurisdiction, since Russia
has allied itself with the Assad regime, which has been accused of
gross human rights violations, and the United States has backed
rebels in the area who have also been accused of abuses and
retaliatory violence.80 Without either Iraq or Syria becoming a party
to the Rome Statue or accepting the ICC's jurisdiction, this avenue for
recourse seems unlikely for either state, especially for Syria-as of
February 2018, Syrian government forces and rebels remain engaged
in a bloody conflict, including severe bombings creating a
humanitarian crisis.1 81
176. Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict:
What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 261 (2007).
177. Karadsheh & Jackson, supra note 34.
178. See Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014) (noting that China
and Russia did not sign on to the Security Council document referring the situation in
Syria to the ICC); Keating, supra note 172 (discussing the unlikeliness of Chinese and
Russian willingness to intervene in Syria after previous involvement by the ICC in
Libya and a general unwillingness for those two countries to violate national
sovereignty in the name of human rights).
179.Keating, supra note 172; see also Iraq: Yezidi Fighters Allegedly Execute
Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/
27/iraq-yezidi-fighters-allegedly-execute-civilians [perma.cc/6LFE-JN9C] (archived
Aug. 25, 2018) (discussing allegations of Yezidi fighters forcibly disappearing and
killing 52 civilians in June 2017).
180. Keating, supra note 172.
181. See, e.g., F. Brinley Bruton, Ammar Cheikh Omar & Lawahez Jabari,
Bombing Intensifies in Eastern Ghouta, Syria: 190 Killed Since Sunday, NBC (Feb. 20,
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/nearly-200-die-syrian-bombing-eastern-
ghouta-intensifies-n849541 [perma.ccIP3DS-SU55] (archived Aug. 25, 2018) (labeling
recent bombings as "the deadliest days" for the area since 2015).
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The UN could create an international criminal tribunal similar
to those created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to prosecute
ISIL in an international forum.182 In anticipation of such a tribunal,
advocacy groups and investigators have been quietly collecting
evidence of ISIL's crimes in northern Iraq for the last two years.8 3
The Daesh Criminal Investigations Unit has been working with the
Commission for International Justice and Accountability-which has
pushed for the establishment of a specialized ISIL tribunal in Iraq-
to collect thousands of documents, phone records, videos, and other
pieces of evidence left by ISIL; they have at least two cases ready for
prosecution and have identified two dozen ISIL leaders and members
linked to crimes against the Yazidis.184 The UN has also authorized
an investigation team to help Iraq hold ISIL accountable through the
collection of evidence in a unanimous Security Council resolution in
September 2017.185 While this was a promising development, a
separate international tribunal remains an improbable option for
prosecution, given the Security Council must vote to establish such a
tribunal.186
2. National & Local Prosecutions-Due Diligence to Investigate and
Punish
Accountability via prosecution of wartime crimes, then, often
falls onto national governments and local communities; UN bodies
have stated that national prosecutions remain the only viable path
for culpability in Syria and Iraq.'8 7 Some domestic prosecutions have
already begun, though they are generally not for crimes of sexual
violence and fall short of satisfying the due diligence standards
regarding investigation and punishment of acts of violence against
women.'8 8 While there are practical reasons for the current failure to
182. See Karadsheh & Jackson, supra note 34 (discussing location options for a




186. Mark Kersten, Calls for prosecuting war crimes in Syria are growing. Is
international justice possible?, WASH. POST, (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/14/calls-for-
prosecuting-war-crimes-in-syria-are-growing-is-international-justice-
possible/?noredirect=on&utm term=.869dc2864701 (discussing the so-far unsuccessful
efforts to refer crimes to the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal due to Security Council vetoes).
187. HRC Report, supra note 15, ¶ 200.
188. See Tamer El-Gobashy & Mustafa Salim, Iraq's Rapid-Fire Trials Send ISIS
Members-Including Foreigners-to the Gallows, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraq-s-rapid-fire-trials-send-alleged-isis-
members-to-the-gallows-1.504465 [https://perma.cc/JY5G-R9F5] (archived Aug. 31,
2018) (explaining Iraq's controversial accelerated trial process for crimes committed by
those linked to ISIS).
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prosecute ISIL for gender-based violent crimes, 189 the non-
prosecution of these crimes reflects the broader neglect of gender-
based violence by international and domestic actors.
As ISIL's territorial control has waned, Iraq has begun
accelerated trials for accused ISIL fighters.1 90 As of December 2017,
the Justice Ministry had disclosed 194 terrorism-related executions-
by hanging-including some twenty-seven foreigners from other Arab
nations.19 1 Up to six thousand more are awaiting execution.192 Courts
have followed Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's orders to quickly
move through these trials in order to "give comfort" to the families of
Islamic State victims.1 93
These trials have revealed serious tensions between Iraq and the
international community, as advocacy groups have expressed concern
over unfair trials and exacerbation of sectarian tensions.1
94 These
accelerated trials are occurring despite the fact that the UN has said
Iraq does not have jurisdiction over ISIL's crimes and that Iraq's
justice system is insufficiently equipped to guarantee due process
rights will be respected in the trials.s9 5 In December of 2017, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) released a report detailing potential problems
with these rapid-fire trials, including both legal credibility concerns
and the potential for impeding proper reconciliation.196 HRW reports
that prior to the trials, individuals are detained in unsafe,
overcrowded conditions with little credible evidence of their.
involvement with ISIL.1 97 Furthermore, charges are often based on
"confessions" obtained under duress or under broad counterterrorism
statutes, leading to a judicial record severely lacking details of the
alleged abuses and crimes.98 These counterterrorism statutes sweep
so broadly that life in prison or the death penalty are viable sentences
for more tangential ISIL actors, such as doctors who worked in ISIL
hospitals, local shop individuals who sold or cooked food for ISIL
189. HRC Report, supra note 15, ¶ 187.




194. Karadsheh & Jackson, supra note 34.
195. El-Gobashy & Salim, supra note 188.
196. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FLAWED JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ISIS
CRIMES IN IRAQ 3-4 (2017), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdfliraql2l7
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HMH-2V8E] (archived Aug. 31, 2018) [hereinafter HRW
Flawed Justice].
197. See id. at 47-49 ("Human Rights Watch visited one cell of roughly 4x6
meters that had been housing 114 detainees for four months. The detainees were not
given regular access to the outdoors or to showers. They ate and used a single toilet
inside the room. The windows were bricked up, and the temperature and stench in the
room were overpowering.").
198. Id. at 4, 21.
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fighters, and lawyers who practiced in ISIL courts.199 To add a
gender-based twist to the due process issue, affiliation with ISIL has
resulted in life in prison or death sentences for ISIL widows and
women.200 This is happening in spite of an August 2016 law that
offers amnesty to anyone who joined ISIL against their will. 201
These shortcomings are also amplified in the judicial system in
the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq, which displays little
coordination and hardly any cohesive approach to the prosecution of
ISIL suspects.202 These regional prosecutions also must work to
overcome the ongoing tensions between the regional Kurdish
government and the central government of Iraq.2 03 In October 2017,
for instance, tensions rose after the Kurdish Regional Government
held an independence referendum; shortly after, Iraq retook the oil-
rich province of Kirkuk by force.20 4
Besides violating defendants' due process rights, and more
importantly for CEDAW obligations of due diligence, these
prosecutions have also been criticized for their lack of victim
involvement, including those who suffered sexual violence, and for
exacerbating harm to victims.20 5 Most of the above-discussed trials
have consisted of terrorism charges, and even those cases involving
sexual crimes have been rushed through without victim
involvement.20 6 For example, one ISIL militant in court admitted, in
addition to other crimes like mass murder, to kidnapping and raping
four Yazidi women, who were part of his "salary."207 While it is
199. Nadim Houry, The Justice Question After ISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/25/justice-question-after-isis
[https://perma.ccl3FZ8-PBUM] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
200. Martin Chulov, 'They deserve no mercy': Iraq deals briskly with accused
'women of Isis, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/may/22/they-deserve-no-mercy-iraq-deals-briskly-with-accused-women-of-isis
[https://perma.cc/9C77-R22G] (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
201. Houry, supra note 199.
202. HRW Flawed Justice, supra note 196, at 22.
203. Maher Chmaytelli & Raya Jalabi, Iraqi forces complete Kirkuk takeover after
clashes with Kurds, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-clashliraqi-forces-complete-kirkuk-province-takeover-after-
clashes-with-kurds-idUSKBNICPOPT [https://perma.cc/MEC3-A9V3 (archived Aug.
31, 2018).
204. Id.
205. Belkis Wille, ISIS is on the Ropes Iraq. Now the UK Needs to Push for
Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 4, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/04/isis-ropes-iraq-now-uk-needs-push-justice
[https://perma.cc/7ASJ-NTRJJ (archived Aug. 31, 2018).
206. Id.
207. Josie Ensor, 'I got four Yazidi virgins as part of my Isil salary and has sex
with a different one every night, THE TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2017),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/31/quivering-isil-suspects-face-
investigations-court-mosul-atrocities/ [https://perma.cc/L9X3-WFGQ] (archived August
28,2018).
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unclear if he was convicted for these sexual crimes or general ISIL
membership, or both,20 8 either way the court declined to involve any
of the four sexual violence victims in the court proceedings.209 So even
in the rare cases where sexual crimes are specifically charged or
discussed, little attention is given to the victim's perspective, personal
needs, or need for accountability.210
Even when there is a suitable legal structure in place, there are
still obstacles to creating an environment where it is acceptable to
speak about sexual violence and that is not detrimental to the victim.
Some of the rhetoric and legal approaches used to describe horrific
crimes like conflict-related sexual violence end up impeding
investigations and testimony regarding these crimes. The importance
of giving victims of sexual violence a voice, particularly in an
investigative or judicial setting, cannot be overstated. Yet, socially
labelling the victims' experiences as "unspeakable or unbearable"
silences victims, informing them the general public does not want to
hear their graphic, detailed accounts.211 Such reluctance extends to
those tasked with seeking justice. Even in the international arena,
rhetoric of rape being the "worst" harm and calling for punishment
can have the unintended consequence of reinforcing harmful,
gendered notions of purity and resulting stigma.2 12 Empirical studies
interviewing judges, prosecutors, investigators, victims, and
witnesses within tribunals like the ICTY report sexist attitudes and
reluctance to deal with these sensitive issues.21 3 Prosecutors state
they are reluctant to ask detailed questions out of embarrassment
and reveal their preference for murder or other cases, a sentiment
prevalent in much of the history of international criminal
208. Compare Wille, supra note 205 ("In one particularly galling example, a
defendant admitted during his trial that he had held four women as sex slaves, raping
a different one each night. But the court only convicted him for ISIS membership.")
with Ensor, supra note 207 ("[The suspect] seemed unrepentant as he confessed to his
crimes; four counts of kidnap and rape of women belonging to the minority Yazidi sect
and 10 counts of the murder of its men.").
209. See Ensor, supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. See Anne-Marie de Brouwer, The Importance of Understanding Sexual
Violence in Conflict for Investigation and Prosecution Purposes, 48 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
639, 660 (2015) ("[T]he greatest challenge for justice.. .is that detailed accounts are
required of issues that we are neither prepared to speak about or hear.").
212. Aolain, O'Rourke & Swaine, supra note 129, at 111-12.
213. See de Brouwer, supra note 211, at 657 ("Several prosecutors and judges
alike made statements like: 'It is so hard to look into [survivors' or witness'] eyes,' 'it is
too close' (a male prosecutor referencing men being the perpetrators in many of the
sexual violence cases), 'I get embarrassed asking questions to rape victims,' 'they
hardly talk about sex in front of strangers, even when as prosecutors they have to talk
to victims,' and 'I would prefer only murder cases. I am more sensitive with women who
have been raped."').
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tribunals.214 This chilling effect may exist despite situations where
survivors are willing to speak and insist that doing so is empowering,
showing they have nothing to hide.215 Others may be silenced by
unwanted exposure and scrutiny: by one recent account, Iraqi
intelligence officers interrogated a fifteen-year old Yazidi girl freed
from her ISIL captor about why she did not escape or notify
authorities, then published the video interview on Facebook without
concern for exposing her identity or for domestic human trafficking
laws protecting victims' privacy.21 6
As gender-based violence and wartime sexual violence have
gained more attention in the international community, prosecution of
such crimes has been scrutinized. On a field visit, the first Special
Rapporteur on violence against women asked the following questions
to provide guidance specifically on the CEDAW due diligence
standard and responding to violence committed by private actors:
Is the criminal justice system sensitive to the issues of violence against women?
... How many cases are investigated by the police? How are the victims dealt
with by the police? How many cases are prosecuted? What type of judgments
are given in such cases? Are the health professionals who assist the prosecution
sensitive to issues of violence against women? Do women who are victims of
violence have support services such as shelters, legal and psychological
counselling, specialized assistance and rehabilitation provided either by the
Government or by non-governmental organizations?2 1 7
Using this guidance, there are clear areas for improvement to
bring Iraq closer in line with its due diligence obligations under
CEDAW regarding criminal prosecution. First, Iraq should
implement better coordination procedures so trials across regions
reflect a national strategy and target the worst perpetrators.218 While
this Note will not discuss at length the due process issues with the
trials in Iraq, it still acknowledges that ensuring fair trials for
defendants is important and required under international law. For
the purposes of this Note, Iraq's lack of victim participation is the
214. See id. (describing the "discomfort" of prosecutors in the Nuremberg trials
regarding sexual violence crimes, which were labeled "too distasteful" to prosecute).
215. See id. (citing several survivors who chose to testify and/or share their
stories publicly).
216. Yezidi Girl's Freedom Opens Door to Justice in Iraq, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/02/yezidi-girls-freedom-opens-door-
justice-iraq [https://perma.cc/XC4W-8CSC] (archived Aug. 29, 2018).
217. Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
its Causes and Consequences), Violence Against Women in the Family, 1 25, U.N. Doc.
E.CN. 4/1999/68 (Mar. 10, 1999).
218. HRW Flawed Justice, supra note 196, at 5-6; see also Karadsheh & Jackson,
supra note 34 ("[E]xactly where and how these cases will be heard is tangled up in the
complexities of politics and differences between the central government in Baghdad
and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil.").
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crucial problem. By prosecuting under the counterterrorism statutes,
which only require a showing of ISIL membership, the courts have
been focused on efficiency rather than the vital task of creating a
judicial record of the wide variety of crimes ISIL has committed
against Iraqis, especially those involving sexual violence.21 9 Ideally,
the victims of those crimes should be invited to participate in these
trials, to provide testimony and confront suspected ISIL members.
There are reports that ISIL victims are interested in this kind of
participation but are not being granted this opportunity.2 20
Iraq's precarious security and financial situation is an
understandable area of concern for those authorities involved in these
prosecutions-last year one judge revealed he had bought everything
in the courtroom, from his desk to air conditioning, with his own
money because "nothing comes from Baghdad" and "[i]f we don't pay
for it, no one else will." 2 21 Given these circumstances, Iraq should
take advantage of all the international help and resources it has
asked for and that are being offered to aid the investigation and
punishment of ISIL perpetrators of sexual or gender-based
violence.2 22 This includes coordinating with the investigative efforts
of actors like the Commission for International Justice and
Accountability-a criminal-investigative group-and the UN Security
Council investigative team, both of which have prioritized the
thorough collection and documentation of evidence of ISIL's crimes.223
The latter, created by UN Security Council Resolution 2379, at Iraq's
request, envisions coordination with Iraqi authorities.224 However,
the resolution also provides that "the evidence collected and stored by
the Team in Iraq should be for eventual use in fair and independent
criminal proceedings, consistent with applicable international law,
conducted by competent national-level courts." 225 The Iraqi
219. HRW Flawed Justice, supra note 196, at 4.
220. See id. at 21-22 ("While victims' communities in Iraq have been calling for
justice, the ongoing trials grant victims no meaningful opportunities to participate,
including to attend, testify, or submit questions to suspects.").
221. Ensor, supra note 207.
222. See Riham Alkousaa, Iraq seeks international help to investigate Islamic
State crimes, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-iraq-unliraq-seeks-international-help-to-investigate-islamic-state-crimes-
idUSKCN1AW2E7 [https://perma.cc/8TDQ-YZDJ] (archived Aug. 29, 2018) (describing
Iraq's formal written request "to get benefited from international expertise to
criminalize Daesh terrorist entity" so it can bring ISIS members to justice in Iraqi
courts).
223. See HRW Flawed Justice, supra note 196, at 62 ("[O]nce the team becomes
operational, it should play a positive role in advocating that federal Iraqi and KRG
authorities bring charges against ISIS suspects for the full range of crimes they have
committed... [and] take a more victim-centered approach to national accountability
efforts.").
224. S.C. Res. 2379, ¶ 5 (Sept. 21, 2017).
225. Id.
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government could facilitate a better relationship with the UN team,
therefore increasing evidence sharing, by reducing the use of the
death penalty.226 And, since the investigative team is mandated to
investigate ISIL crimes exclusively, the Iraqi government should not
be concerned with investigations into its own possibly criminal
actions during the conflict.227 The Iraqi government can also enhance
coordination with other investigator-actors by criminalizing genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity in its domestic law.228
In addition to providing legal processes, Iraq should also ensure
those legal options are actually available to victims-as will be
discussed, some communities have taken steps to combat the social
and cultural obstacles to legal redress.
B. Due Diligence and Reparations
The UN has issued documents highlighting the right to an
effective remedy within the due diligence framework. For instance,
the Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Reparations for
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence provides policy and operational
guidance for the United Nations when dealing with reparations in
this area, with particular emphasis on victim participation, the
transformative goal of reparations, and the gendered nature and
consequences of the harms at issue.229 Out of a number of post-
conflict mechanisms, the UN Secretary-General has highlighted
reparations as the "most victim-centered justice mechanism available
and the most significant means of making a difference in the lives of
victims." 230 The CEDAW Committee has also highlighted the
importance of reparations having transformative effects for women,
covering more than just civil and political rights violations.2 31 This
226. See Yola Verbruggen, Bringing ISIS to justice, INT'L BAR Ass'N (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=4C5AO20B-0A96-
4421-9572-71825DO87D82 [https://perma.cc/8P7K-BMVA] (archived Aug. 30, 2018)
(citing Iraq's use of the death penalty as the main obstacle to settling on the terms of
reference for the investigation team).
227. See S.C. Res. 2379, supra note 224, ¶ 2 (authorizing the establishment of an
investigative team "to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da'esh) accountable by
collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL
(Da'esh) in Iraq").
228. See, e.g., HRW Flawed Justice, supra note 196, at 27 ("Iraqi judicial
authorities are also unable to prosecute international crimes such as war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide because they are not enshrined in national
law.").
229. Reparations Guidance Note, supra note 84, at 1-2.
230. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, T 26, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634, (Oct. 12, 2011).
231. See General Recommendation 30, supra note 135, ¶¶ 74, 79, 81 ("For most
women, post-conflict justice priorities should not be limited to ending violations of civil
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means one goal of transitional justice mechanisms like reparations is
to encourage states to take advantage of opportunities to confront and
remedy the entrenched sex and gender-based iscrimination that has
previously impeded the fulfillment of rights under the CEDAW
Convention.232
Reparations exist in forms such as restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. 233
Other goals for reparations include encouraging structural reforms
and preventing a "domino effect," where sexual violence results in
additional losses.234 Reparation programs thus are both backward
looking, aiming to repair a past wrong, and forward looking, helping
to rebuild and reconcile the community. 23 5 These broader goals,
however, must be translated into rules and policies, which lead to a
number of practical implementation questions, which will be
discussed below.
1. Reparations-Compensation
Many reparations seek to compensate individual victims
materially for the harm he or she has suffered. Compensation is a
common form of reparation, but monetary support can be difficult to
implement and is an insufficient remedy without other forms of
reparations.
First, obstacles arise as lawmakers inevitably must draw lines
categorizing and defining who is a "victim" or what crimes qualify for
reparations.23 6 For example, some reparations programs explicitly list
the forms of sexual violence qualifying a victim for reparations, which
may or may not be read expansively to include acts such as: sexual
slavery, as in Guatemala; forced abortion, as in Peru; and genital
mutilation, as in both countries.23 7 Even programs that have broader
conceptions of sexual violence may be inclined to prioritize and
categorize certain forms of sexual violence over others. Other
and political rights but should include violations of all rights including economic, social
and cultural rights.").
232. See generally id.
233. Reparations Guidance Note, supra note 84, at 1-2.
234. Colleen Duggan & Ruth Jacobson, Reparation of Sexual and Reproductive
Violence: Moving from Codification to Implementation, in THE GENDER OF
REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHES WHILE REDRESSING HumAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 121, 124 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed., 2009).
235. Ruth Rubio-Marin, Gender and Collective Reparations in the Aftermath of
Conflict and Political Repression, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS, supra note 234, at
382.
236. See Duggan & Jacobson, supra note 234, at 132-36 (discussing the "double-
edged sword" of both categorizing qualifying sexual violence broadly and in more
detail).
237. See id. at 132 (comparing the wording of various definitions and categories).
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questions arise about who is included in reparation programs. Family
members of victims may qualify as "beneficiaries" who experienced
some damage, such as the loss of potential future children, and
children themselves born of rape may be included in the "victim"
status.238 There is, however, a gender component to this approach.
For instance, the program in Guatemala, citing resources and the
disparate statistics, only permitted female sexual violence victims to
receive reparations whereas other programs have chosen not to base
qualification on gender.23 9 Furthermore, monetary compensation may
bring its own discriminatory issues: there is a danger in placing some
"price" or monetary worth on a woman's loss of virginity or
reproductive injuries, particularly in contexts where providing
compensation, especially to male beneficiaries, would reinforce
patriarchal notions of a woman's value stemming from her ability to
have children. 240 Reparations recognizing the material hardships
stemming from sexual violence may be beneficial, but only if
administered in a gender-sensitive way-this sensitivity might entail
distributing compensation while respecting those victims who wish to
remain anonymous.24 1
A number of scholars and activists have expressed a preference
for administrative monetary reparatiois programs over those
obtained in a judicial setting. While acknowledging that victims
should always have the option of judicial reparations awards, the UN
Secretary-General observed that administrative reparations may be
preferable for large scale violations. 242 The latter offer greater
potential to help victims for a number of reasons: administrative
reparations avoid some of the difficulties and higher costs of
litigation, the need for evidence that may be difficult to find, pain and
potential embarrassment when being cross-examined in court, and
victims' lack of confidence in the justice system.243 This preference
assumes that these programs are simplified procedurally, have lower
evidence requirements, and spare victims some of the potential
stigma through confidentiality.24 4
238. Id. at 137.
239. See id. at 138 ("Scarcity of resources and the largely disparate numbers of
male and female victims may justify the temptation to limit benefits for women, but
doing so reinforces the notion that only women can be subject to such offences,
underscoring notions of femininity and masculinity that would actually be worth
subverting.").
240. Id. at 137, 139 (suggesting a way to avoid the beneficiary problem would be
to include family members of victims of sexual violence as potential candidates for
medical and psychological support rather than compensation, as was recommended in
Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste).
241. Id. at 139.
242. Reparations Guidance Note, supra note 84, at 6.
243. Duggan & Jacobson, supra note 234, at 132.
244. Id.
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While UN efforts like the Guidance Note have amplified the
rhetoric of protecting individuals from sexual violence in conflict,
there is a stark difference between these statements and actual,
direct support to survivors.245 Even the binary distinction between
"conflict" and "post-conflict" fails to appreciate the continuous
experience and vulnerabilities of certain populations, including
women, in conflict-related areas. 246 Normative language and
frameworks for talking about gender-based violence easily translate
to the more situation-specific category of conflict-related sexual
violence, as this Note has illustrated, and in reality women's
experiences with violence may not reflect a clear distinction between
violence occurring during conflict versus in peace. Moreover,
restitution is often considered a process of restoring the victim to her
original situation, before any violations occurred.24 7 However, such
restoration is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, when the harm
is inflicted through sexual violence and involves serious health and
psychological problems.248
On a practical, operational level, material reparations programs
face the challenge of finding sufficient political will following violent
conflicts.249 Transitional processes or moments present opportunities,
when the political will is present, to establish reparations in
conjunction with negotiations and truth commissions. Furthermore,
there must be a clear administrative framework; in particular, the
weakness of a domestic judicial system may mean that even when
reparations are awarded, they may not be enforced and received.
25 0
The conflicts in the Balkans and former Yugoslavia and
subsequent attempts at victim compensation illustrate some of the
obstacles to proper redress. In 2015, for example, Croatia's
parliament voted to enact a compensation scheme for rape victims of
the Yugoslavian conflict.251 This scheme involves a one-off payment of
100,000 kuna, or approximately $14,504, and a monthly allowance of
245. See, e.g., Aolain, O'Rourke, & Swaine, supra note 129, at 101-02 (describing
the particular gap between the rhetoric and reality of remedies for women).
246. See id. at 105 ("The terms 'conflict' and 'post-conflict' tend to obscure the
continuum of violence from ordinary times, to time of conflict, and into post-conflict
settings, thereby creating false fissures in the capture of violent experiences. For
women, the experience is often continuous rather than disjunctive.").
247. Id. at 119.
248. See id. (emphasizing the importance of land and property ownership in the
restitution context rather than on social notions of purity or honor).
249. See id. at 127 ("Reparations in post- conflict contexts do not emerge in a
political vacuum.").
250. See id. at 132 (discussing how a weak justice system in the DRC prevented
receipt of many judicial awards).
251. Zoran Radosavljevic, Croatia passes law to compensate war rape victims,
REUTERS (May 29, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-croatia-rape/croatia-passes-
law-to-compensate-war-rape-victims-idUKKBNOE1M820150529
[https://perma.cc/3HPS-EL72] (archived Aug. 30, 2018).
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2,500 kuna, in addition to free counseling, medical aid, and legal
help. 252 With compensation coming over two decades after the
conflict, survivors have expressed gratitude for compensation but said
billions "could not pay for what we went through."25 3 Victims have
also expressed frustration with the fact that many of their
perpetrators, who were low-level rebels or soldiers, still live in the
area after blanket amnesty was granted, saying "the law and the
compensation are worth nothing if the perpetrators continue to walk
free."25 4 Twenty years of silence, many advocates say, means that few
will actually come forward after accepting for so long that society
neglected them.255 Additionally, those that do come forward may not
necessarily receive financial compensation. In 2017, a Serb woman
went to court to challenge the Croatian War Veterans Ministry's
decision to deny her wartime victim status and therefore her
compensation.25 6 The plaintiff, M.K., applied in 2016 but was denied
on the basis of unpersuasive allegations, and may find no further
avenue for remedies since there is no appeal process for the ministry's
decisions.25 7
From the victims' perspective, other nations involved in the
Balkan conflict of the 1990s have failed to hold abusers and
perpetrators of sexual crimes accountable. Bosnian women complain
about seeing their perpetrators in their neighborhood and can keep
track of them on Facebook.25 8 Many-some reports say up to 95
percent-end up facing additional trauma in the form of domestic
abuse.2 5 9 Even the collective memory of the communities has ignored
or slighted the suffering of women and sexual violence survivors
during the conflicts. For example, one of the main commemorative
sites, the Srebrenica visitor center, infrequently displays women and
when there is graffiti or images of women, they often portray the
women in an insulting or degrading manner.260 Victims' testimony




255. Arijeta Lajka, Balkan Wartime Rape Victims Continue to Face Hardships
Decades after Conflict, VICE NEWS (Apr. 13, 2015), https://news.vice.com/articlefbalkan-
wartime-rape-victims-continue-to-face-hardships-decades-after-conflict
[https://perma.cc/QBP3-S9Z6] (archived Aug. 30, 2018).
256. Sven Milekic, War Rape Victim Sues Croatian Ministry, BALKAN INSIGHT
(Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.balkaninsight.com/enlarticle/croatia-denies-sexual-war-
victim-her-status- 11-20-2017 [https://perma.c/9VAX-SUB4] (archived Aug. 30, 2018).
257. Id.
258. Sue Turton, Bosnian war rape survivors speak of their suffering 25 years on,
INDEPENDENT (July 21, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long-reads/bosnia-
war-rape-survivors-speak- serbian-soldiers-balkans-women-justice-suffering-
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and children who died, but will classify their own trauma by saying,
"well, I lived." 26 1 Financial compensation was available to victims
under Bosnian law, but only through criminal proceedings, during
which victims had to reveal their identities and proceed without any
financial support.262 No victim actually received a ruling granting
compensation until 2015.263
These financial compensation programs and others provide
valuable lessons for implementing any kind of program for victims of
ISIL sexual violence.264 The government in Iraq publicly expressed a
commitment to the issue of conflict-related sexual violence.
265 As
recently as March 2018, the Iraqi government ordered IQD$2 million,
or approximately USD$1,700, to be paid to every Yazidi released from
ISIL captivity. 266 These statements of support and actions are
encouraging, and activists and victims should use these statements to
hold the government accountable for programs aimed at aiding the
Yazidis and other victims of ISIL's acts of sexual violence. In
particular, activists should push for an administrative reparations
program; given the limited procedural and financial capacities of the
Iraqi courts at the moment,2 67 such a program may be more feasible
and effective in actually delivering meaningful reparations to
victims.268 Furthermore, even for reparations programs with lower
evidentiary standards, it is essential for the government,
international actors, and individuals to continue investigating and
documenting the crimes of ISIL. 269
Besides some encouraging rhetoric from the government, there is
also reason to be optimistic about a reparations scheme, since Iraq is
not a stranger to legal compensation schemes for victims. In 2009, the
261. Id.
262. Bosnian courts grants wartime rape compensation in landmark ruling, THE
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/bosnian-
court-grants-wartime-victim-compensation-landmark-ruling [https://perma.cc/X2GN-
F968] (archived Sept. 1, 2018).
263. Id.
264. See Igor Spaic, Yazidi Massacre Survivors Learn Lessons from Srebrenica,
BALKAN INSIGHT (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.balkaninsight.com/enlarticle/yazidi-
massacre-survivors-learn-lessons-from-srebrenica-08-03-2017 [https://perma.cclNAD2-
RLA9] (archived Sept. 1, 2018) (describing Yazidis' commemoration of three years since
ISIL attacked and their determination to have ISIL crimes recognized as genocide like
the former Yugoslavia conflict).
265. See, e.g., Iraq Confirms Commitment, supra note 169.
266. Money Welcome but No Panacea for Iraq's Yezidi Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/08/money-welcome-no-
panacea-iraqs-yezidi-victims [https://perma.cc/J82E-55U4] (archived Sept. 1, 2018).
267. See, e.g., Ensor, supra note 207 (quoting Iraqi judges who attribute Iraq's
imperfect legal processes to lack of funding).
268. Duggan & Jacobson, supra note 234, at 132.
269. See, e.g., Spaic, supra note 264 ("It is imperative that this forensic evidence
needs to be collected as soon as possible.. and that the survivors and the victims have
their day in court.").
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Iraqi parliament passed Law No. 20 on Compensation for Victims of
Military Operations, Military Mistakes, and Terrorist Actions, which
was amended in 2015.270 The specific types of damage covered
included martyrdom or loss, full or partial disability, injuries and
conditions requiring short-term treatment, damage to property, and
damage affecting employment and study.27 1 This law is unlikely to
cover any of the sexual violence crimes this Note has discussed,
despite all the direct and indirect effects of sexual violence on a
person's physical state, ability to work, and mental health, among
others. 272 The law has also faced some implementation issues,
including bureaucratic delays due to a decentralized structure and a
stringent evidentiary standard that has only become more onerous as
the security situation has worsened.273
Still, even with its challenges, the compensation law may be
useful either as a means or model for compensating victims of sexual
violence: there are some structures in place already to provide victims
with monetary aid, which may be assessed for their successes and
flaws as officials think about how to deal with ISIL victims. 274
Furthermore, the government has shown in certain cases it can adapt
to crises by lowering evidentiary requirements and drastically
reducing delays for compensating victims. 275 While not every
situation involves state actors as the perpetrators, state
responsibility is still key to meaningful cimpensation: without states
like Iraq acknowledging their responsibility to redress the harms of
sexual violence, stigma will persist and recurrence may be more
likely. 276 However, even as the KRG and Iraqi governments are
coordinating to provide compensation to victims, one Yazidi
representative noted how much was left to do: as of March 2018, "[a]t
least 3260 Yazidis have so far been rescued from the IS captivity, but
another three thousand of them are estimated to still be at the hands
of the extremist group."
270. CLARA SANDOVAL & MIRIAM PUTTICK, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP,
REPARATIONS FOR THE VICTIMS OF CONFLICT IN IRAQ: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
COMPARATIVE PRACTICE 17 (2017),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Reparations-in-Iraq-Ceasefire-
November-2017.pdf [https://perma.ce/4NQB-3XVN] (archived Sept. 1, 2018).
271. Id. at 17-18.
272. Id. at 22.
273. Id. at 19-20.
274. Id. at 25-26.
275. See id. at 25 (describing how the government established an ad hoc
committee to deal with claims from the 2016 Karrada bombing and how loosened
document requirements enabled the committee to finish its work within about forty
days).
276. Aolain, O'Rourke, & Swaine, supra note 129, at 132.
277. Every Yezidi Survivor to Receive Two Million IQD: Official, BASNEWS (Mar.
6, 2018), http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/420348 [https://perma
2018] 1461
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
2. Collective or Non-Monetary Reparations
Reparations need not be monetary or individual, and in recent
years, collective reparations have been increasingly incorporated into
responses to conflict-related sexual violence.278 Using both individual
and collective reparations reflects, as one scholar articulated, "the
growing trend towards complexity, as well as, in many situations, a
concession to the need to reach out to a wide universe of victims with
meager resources."279 In this setting, reparations serve not only as a
remedy and recognition of group-based rights violations, but have a
symbolic purpose as an "expression of commitment" of the political
system to protect certain rights.2 8 0
The term collective reparations can refer to a number of
measures and often serves multiple goals simultaneously. For
example, "collective" may refer to a benefit being given to a group
rather than individual victims, a benefit that is a public or non-
excludable good, a benefit focused on a certain geographical region,
and forms of redress focusing on group-based violence.28 1 These
include concrete things like sensitization campaigns regarding
violence against women, training army and police on women's rights,
vetting public-order forces, gender-sensitive school programs,
symbolic reparations such as collective apologies, gender quotas, or
measures to encourage women's political participation, and reforming
political and legal systems to remove traces of discrimination against
women.282 From the rehabilitative perspective, reparations can range
from providing legal, health, psychological, and other social
services283 to more symbolic, reconciliatory actions like apologies,
commemorations, and memorials.2 84 These latter symbolic measures
also serve the other modalities of reparation like satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition, namely commitment to combating
future conflict-related sexual violence.2 85 However, these measures
may not be successful if undertaken without victim consultation.
.cc/QEG2-CN29] (archived Sept. 1, 2018); see also Nehal Mostafa, Yazidi activist:
Islamic State detains Iraqi women, children in underground prisons in Syria, IRAQI
NEWS (June 1, 2018), https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/yazidi-activist-islamic-state-
detains-iraqi-women-children-in-underground-prisons-in-syrial [https://perma.cc/6ZA9-
6ZM2] (archived Sept. 1, 2018) (describing hundreds still in captivity as of June 2018).
278. See, e.g., Ruth Rubio-Marin, Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual and
Reproductive Violence: A Decalogue, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 69, 95 (2012).
279. Id.
280. Rubio-Marin, supra note 278, at 383.
281. Id. at 385.
282. Id. at 395.
283. Reparations Guidance Note, supra note 84, at 18-19.
284. Rubio-Marin, supra note 278, at 397.
285. Reparations Guidance Note, supra note 84, at 19-20.
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In all kinds of accountability mechanisms-criminal,
compensatory, and collective reparations-a major hurdle to
achieving these broader goals is overcoming the stigma associated
with victims of wartime rape or sexual violence. From the perspective
of the perpetrator, rape in conflict frequently is designed to foster and
encourage this stigma to the point of destroying the social fabric of
certain groups-possibly even rising, as many have argued in the
case of the Yazidis, to the level of genocide.286 This kind of stigma is
universal in post-conflict situations and may exist even when
government and community leaders make efforts to reintegrate rape
victims without any shaming. To provide one example, after the war
of independence in the 1970s, the Bengali government publicly
labeled sexual violence victims as "war heroines," with the prime
minister calling these birangonas his "daughters." 287 However,
despite these public overtures to welcome victims back into the
community, many birangonas were disrespected and shamed to the
point of suicide or fleeing the country.288
In the case of Iraq, there are reasons to be more optimistic about
the stigma and the possibility of other, transformative collective
reparations. First, the plight of the Yazidis and other victims of ISIL's
sexual enslavement has been well-documented in the global media,
and international voices continue to call for justice. On the ground,
local Kurdish and Yazidi efforts in this area have been promising for
those survivors of ISIL. The Yazidi faith has traditionally condemned
those who have converted to other religions, even when coerced, and
has endorsed views on women's purity and dignity that allow for
honor killings.289 However, the horrors the Yazidis faced at the hands
of ISIL have altered some of these practices and beliefs. Activists
approached religious leaders to publicly and officially change
doctrine; leaders listened and created a new religious ceremony, a
form of baptism, for enslaved women to reenter the faith.290 The
286. Press Release, Security Council, Shame, Stigma Integral to Logic of Sexual
Violence as War Tactic, Special Advisor Tells Security Council, as Speakers Demand
Recognition for Survivors, U.N. Press Release SC/12819 (May 15, 2017); see also
Courtney McCausland, From Tolerance to Tactic: Understanding Rape in Armed
Conflict as Genocide, 25 MICH. ST. INTL L. REV. 149, 179, 182 (2017) (using literature
on the Rwandan genocide that explains how "many rapists expected, consequent to
their attacks, that the psychological and physical assault on each Tutsi woman would
advance the cause of the destruction of the Tutsi people").
287. McCausland, supra note 286, at 183.
288. See id. (describing the Prime Minister's futile efforts in light of Bengali
traditional views of purity and sexuality).
289. See Tiffany Barrans, Realizing Universal Women's Rights Through Deeply
Local Grassroots Advocacy, 22 TRINITY L. REV. 57, 62 (2016) (describing how before
ISIL, family and community members may carry out an honor killing of Yazidi rape
victim because of the shame the rape brought to the family and the community).
290. Id. at 62-64 (quoting one survivor who said the baptism helped her "be
clean again" after her assaults).
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spiritual leader Baba Sheik issued an edict and called on the
community to cooperate so the victims may return to their normal
lives and rejoin society.2 91 Furthermore, at least in the Kurdistan
region, there has been some shelter and center support. Foreign
governments and organizations have partnered with locals to open
several centers for displaced individuals, particularly Yazidi
women. 292 These kinds of actions, in combating the stigma
surrounding sexual violence, can make a world of difference for
survivors and should be encouraged for all victims of sexual violence.
Other reforms, identified by local women's advocates and NGOs,
have the potential to provide significant material and symbolic
support to victims of the conflict and to enact more lasting changes in
line with CEDAW's goals of eliminating discrimination. For example,
NGOs have advocated for changes to Iraq's laws in order to permit
non-government women shelters to support these women. Currently,
the Iraqi government has only permitted government-run shelters to
operate in the country, preventing local NGOs from providing
immediate aid to at-risk individuals in southern and central Iraq,
particularly women.29 3 Domestic violence shelters are viewed as
helping women disobey their male relatives or even as brothels; the
fear is that the availability of shelters will dismantle Iraqi families.294
Allowing non-governmental shelters across the whole country would
make a significant difference to local communities by creating
supportive services and encouraging community jobs.29 5
Another major reform that would empower women fleeing or
residing in conflict areas is the removal of certain requirements for
legal identification for women. Iraqi Civil Status Identification
Documents and Nationality Certificates are vital for public services
like food assistance, healthcare, school for their children, and
housing, but women can only obtain such identification if they have a
male family member who can corroborate their identity.296 Such
291. Maher Chmaytelli, Yazidi leader seeks protection for community after
genocide, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-
iraq-yazidis/yazidi-leader-seeks-protection-for-community-after-genocide-
idUSKBN13X11G [https://perma.cc/XQ93-GXLM] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
292. Community Centers offer support to survivors of sexual violence in Iraq,
NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.npaid.org[News/News-
archive/2016/Community- Centers-offer-support-to-survivors-of-sexual-violence-in-Iraq
[https://perma.cc/J34K-PSP9] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
293. Lisa Davis, Iraqi Women Confronting ISIL: Protecting Women's Rights in
the Context of Conflict, 22 Sw. J. INT'L L. 27, 63-64 (2016).
294. See id. at 64 (quoting an Iraqi official who stated, after denial of a license for
opening a domestic violence shelter, the establishment of such shelters would lead the
majority of women to exploit the role and leave their families).
295. See id. at 65 ("In the absence of government-sponsored services and legal
remedies to address gender-based violence, Iraqi women's NGOs are at the forefront of
providing necessary services.").
296. See id. at 68-69.
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requirements have serious repercussions for women, who may be
more likely to suffer violence, trafficking, and discrimination as a
result of being denied social services.29 7 The regional government of
Kurdistan has responded to these problems, in part, by issuing
temporary identification to some displaced persons who can prove
their identities through letters of support or other government
identification documents.2 98
These are just a few of the reforms important for survivors of
sexual violence-other significant collective reparations include
access to healthcare services, ensuring documentation of human
rights abuses, and actually funding the Iraqi laws in place that
recognize the vulnerabilities of women during conflict and prescribe a
variety of solutions.299 Iraq should work with those international
actors and NGOs who have pledged to provide millions of dollars to
rebuild and provide much needed public and humanitarian services
and stability for recovering communities like the Yazidis.3 00
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear the story of ISIL in Iraq and Syria is far from over. In
recent weeks, investigators with the UN have found over two
hundred mass grave sites containing the remains of at least six
thousand victims, with other estimates closer to twelve thousand.3 0 '
Moreover, in October 2018 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to
activist Nadia Murad and Dr. Denis Mukwege, a Congolese
297. See id. ("Lack of legal access to an identification card paves the way for
traffickers aided by sophisticated criminal networks to forge documents and pay
corrupt officials to remove impediments in order to traffic women and children.").
298. Id.
299. See id. at 75-76 (describing the National Action Plan passed by the Iraqi
Government in 2015, which acknowledges many of the vulnerabilities and issues
surrounding sexual violence in conflict but has not been supported with funding).
300. Seth J. Frantzman, Yazidis Who Saw Genocide Still Insecure in Iraq's
Sinjar Region, JERUSALEM POST (June 3, 2018), https://www.jpost.comfMiddle-
East/Yazidis-who-saw-genocide-still-suffer-insecurity-in-Iraqs-Sinjar-region-559055
[https://perma.cclRQ7B-8Q6N] (archived Sept. 2, 2018) (describing conditions and
frustrations of Yazidis who have lived in refugee camps for years); NGOs pledge $330m
as Iraq seeks $90bn for reconstruction, KUWAIT TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018),
http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/ngos-pledge-330m-iraq-seeks-90bn-reconstruction/
[https://perma.cclRJ23-NCPF] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
301. Bill Chappell, Islamic State Dumped At Least 6,000 Bodies in Mass Graves
in Iraq, U.N. Says, NPR (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/06/664641098/
islamic-state-dumped-at-least-6-000-bodies-in-mass-graves-in-iraq-u-n-says; see
generally U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNEARTHING
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gynecologist who has treated thousands of rape victims, for their
"efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war." 302
The ISIL conflict that has consumed Iraq and Syria these past
few years is no exception to the rule that war will always include high
levels of sexual violence. The emergence of ISIL and their brutal yet
bureaucratic tactics, like the enslavement of Yazidis like Nadia, has
renewed focus on the mechanisms and frameworks for criminal
liability for perpetrators of war crimes, including sexual violence
offenses.
Despite the inevitable combination of war and sexual violence,
international law has been slow to respond. The history of gender-
based violence has long been one of silencing victims and impunity for
perpetrators of these crimes; these aspects are only amplified when
there is destructive conflict and a difficult transition to peace. While
women's voices in particular have forced the international community
to respond to gender-based violence, overall, there are still
shortcomings in addressing this kind of violence in the structures and
mechanisms of international law. CEDAW, for example, remains one
of the sole "treaty-tools" for addressing gender-based violence and
conflict-related sexual violence. However, although CEDAW has been
greatly expanded to include these issues, there remains a gap as long
as the treaty does not explicitly discuss violence against women, in
peace or in war.
Still, as the legal frameworks stand, these extensive
interpretations of CEDAW remain the best framework for addressing
conflict-related sexual violence in places like Iraq. The due diligence
standard requires states to act reasonably to prevent, punish,
investigate, or redress harms caused by nonstate actors, including
acts of violence towards women. In the case of Iraq in the aftermath
of ISIL, there is ample opportunity to adhere to its obligations to
investigate, punish, and redress those who suffered sexual violence at
the hands of ISIL. While international prosecutions are unlikely,
Iraq's own domestic prosecution of ISIL members should incorporate
victims of sexual violence into the legal process and charge sexual
crimes so the perpetrators of such crimes are punished for them. Iraq,
in particular, should take advantage of all international aid provided,
including the investigative resources of the United Nations, to ensure
its trials are fair and victim-centric. Additionally, there are several
concrete reforms Iraq can implement both to redress victims of sexual
violence and to eliminate structural discrimination in its own laws
and society. These include legal, psychological, and health services, a
302. Nobel Peace Prize for Anti-Rape Activists Nadia Murad and Denis Mukwege,
BBC (Oct. 5. 2018), https://www.bbc.comlnews/world-europe-45759221.
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potential compensatory reparations program, working with NGOs to
permit more women's shelters, and repealing stringent laws
exacerbating vulnerabilities of women, like the identification
requirements.
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